URBAN VIII

2

URBAN'S PONTIFICATE TO THE TREATY OF CHERASCO

 

THE new pontiff was favourably received by his fellow sovereigns. The duke of Alcala conveyed as warm congratulations from his Catholic Majesty as the duke of Crequi from his Most Christian Brother. The Empire, Poland, and the States of Italy, hastened to proffer their felicitations. Nor was Urban's welcome confined to Europe. The "sultan" of Ethiopia assured him of his continued fidelity to the catholic church. The emir Facardin, "sultan" of Sidon, sent an ambassador to Rome to protest his loyalty to the papacy, and to beg Urban to emulate his great namesake by launching a crusade for the recovery of Palestine. The king of the Congo, "a people and country new to the ears of Europe", recognized the lately crowned pontiff as head of the universal church. Urban was gratified by the good wishes which he received from the catholic princes of Europe; he expressed even greater delight at the proofs of the progress of the faith among the heathen.

It happened not infrequently after a papal election that the monarchs of Europe were more interested in the personality and the policy of the new pope's advisers than in those of the pope himself. This was not the case on the present occasion. In the earlier years of his pontificate, Urban was more nearly an autocrat than any of his immediate predecessors had been. The comments of an intelligent foreigner show the high estimate contemporaries had formed of his abilities; the pope himself joined in this opinion. Nicoletti represents him as directly inspiring and controlling the complex working of papal diplomacy at the various catholic courts, and the biographer's picture is confirmed by the reports of the foreign envoys at Rome. During the later years of Paul V and the whole of Gregory XV's reign, men had been accustomed to the spectacle of the cardinal nephew ruling, while the pope reigned. Urban was not the man to tolerate in his government the powers which Scipio Borghese and Ludovico Ludovisi had exercised under their respective uncles. He was well provided with relatives, but he did not allow them to assume too prominent a position at the curia during the earlier years of his reign. He was, it is true, animated by a natural affection for his kinsfolk: there is extant a letter written, during his archbishopric, to the young Francesco Barberini, which shows Urban's love for his nephews and his anxiety that they should grow up pious, god-fearing men: he urges the future cardinal not to subordinate godliness to mere learning, and ends with a kiss to little Taddeo. Unfortunately the pope was a man who was not in advance of his age in his ideas about nepotism: in his earlier years he proved himself more moderate than his predecessors in rewarding his kinsfolk; but afterwards he degenerated. The gifts of offices and money which built up the Barberini family are a serious blemish on his record. Of his brothers, Alessandro, Niccolo and Giovanni, were already dead: the eldest and the youngest of Camilla Barberini's sons still survived. The eldest, Don Carlo Barberini, was made general of the church, in accordance with precedent. The youngest brother, Marcello, who had assumed the name of Antonio on becoming a Capuchin, was made cardinal; but he had little ambition for worldly honours, and seized the first opportunity of withdrawing from Rome to his purely religous duties. In later years he was appointed librarian of the Vatican, on the resignation of his nephew, Francesco. Cardinal Lorenzo Magalotti, who had smoothed his relative's path to the papal throne by his discreet conduct after the death of Gregory XV, shared his sovereign's confidence with Don Carlo. Both were shrewd, tactful men, who had no desire to rouse their neighbours' jealousy by ostentatious display of power, as Ludovico Ludovisi had done. Magalotti remained studiously in the background, and his brother-in-law was equally sensible. The general of the church, who was gifted with the commercial abilities of his ancestors, was content to discharge the duties and to reap the rewards of his office, without obtruding himself on the public vision. The object of his life was to found a family, with the help of his brother. It was no longer possible to carve out dukedoms from the papal territory for the kinsmen of the reigning pontiff, nor did Urban intend to diminish his sovereignty, even for the sake of his family. But an able man, who held important offices in the state and received a considerable income from the papal revenues, could, by wise investments and judicious marriages, add one more to the noble families of Rome. Carlo Barberini succeeded admirably in his task, without exciting the animosity of his contemporaries. When he died, in February 1630, the fortunes of his house were firmly established.

His three sons all held important positions in the papal government. The eldest, Francesco, was raised to the cardinalate in October 1623, and received the legateship of Avignon and the prefecture of the seigniory of justice. Nicoletti tells us that these appointments were received "with universal applause", owing to Francesco's "wisdom, prudence, and piety".  This statement is confirmed by an unprejudiced observer, who bears witness to his moral worth, kindliness and incorruptibility, and expresses the conviction that Francesco was genuinely averse from assuming the responsibilities of office. The cardinal continued to be the laborious agent who carried out his uncle's instructions: even after ten years of Urban's pontificate had elapsed, it could be said of him that "there has never been a papal nephew more assiduous in the labours of the state than he, ... but it is also true that none has ever effected less than he has done".  Carlo's second son, Taddeo, became the secular nephew; his economy and careful management increased the wealth which his father had amassed. He followed the latter as general of the church, was made governor of the Borgo, commander of St. Angelo, and prince of Palestrina, and acquired the territories of Valmontine and Monterotondo. On the death of the duke of Urbino in 1631, his uncle invested him with the vacant prefecture of Rome. A suitable bride was found for him, and his marriage with Anna Colonna, followed by the promotion of Girolamo Colonna to the cardinalate, marked the definite inclusion of the Barberini family among the nobility of Rome. The youngest brother, Antonio, was of a more ambitious temperament than Francesco or Taddeo. He was only fourteen when his uncle became pope, but he did not allow his youth to hinder his advancement. He acquired no less than six commanderies from the Order of Malta, and, unlike his eldest brother, did not scruple to use his position for the acceptance of presents from papal suitors. In February 1628 he received the cardinal's hat from his uncle, and immediately assumed a more prominent position at the Roman court. His influence did not make for peace at the curia, and his jealousy of Francesco caused the pope considerable difficulty.

Although Urban followed the usual custom in promoting his relatives and conferring on them considerable revenues from the papal exchequer, he did not allow them to control his policy. It was almost inevitable in those days that the sovereign pontiff should be surrounded by his kinsfolk; the representatives of foreign powers did not like transacting business through any other medium. Urban adopted the system, but took good care to keep the government in his own hands. If his autocratic nature would not tolerate control by his relatives, still less was he likely to submit to the dictation of other cardinals, who were often mere national partizans. The congregations still met for the discussion of the various details of government, but they served mainly as the mouthpiece of Urban's wishes. It was said that, although the pope consulted his cardinals, he did so only for form's sake. The brilliant Ludovisi and the once powerful Scipio Borghese found that they had chosen to reign over them a master, who acknowledged no other dictation save that of his own will or his own conscience. Borgia, though backed by the whole weight of Spanish influence, could not turn the pope from his purposes. The Venetian cardinals were powerless to avert his wrath from the republic. Rarely, if ever, did the members of the sacred college possess less influence on the course of affairs, than during the first ten momentous years of Urban's pontificate.

The new pope found a number of problems awaiting solution, when he mounted the throne. He attacked them with his usual energy, despite the fact that he was still suffering from the effects of recent illness. The first business which he undertook concerned the negotiations for the marriage projected between the prince of Wales and the infanta of Spain. Without waiting to hear from James, the pope, who had, as cardinal, gained an insight into the question, despatched to England a lengthy epistle, expressing his pleasure at the proposed alliance. In it, flattery of the king's literary ability and exhortations to win a "mitra gloriae aeternae," by returning to the true faith, are judiciously blended. Arguments are drawn from the examples of James's catholic ancestors and the British-born Constantine, who rendered the church such glorious services. Finally Urban exclaims: "I saw in Britain a new heaven and a new city descending from heaven, and above the walls angels keeping guard": the realization of such a vision would be the crowning glory of his pontificate. Meanwhile, he had received a letter from the infanta's impatient wooer. Urban hastened to express his gratification at Charles's choice of a bride: "You, who desire so greatly to wed a catholic maiden, should surely take to yourself that bride, by whose beauty Solomon, that wisest of kings, boasts that he was taken captive". He informed the prince of his intention to make every effort to expedite the union, and pointed out the benefits to Catholicism which would flow from it. With unconscious irony he added, "Consider how that at the court of Spain you are now made a spectacle for God and man." While thus plying the English royal house with exhortation and advice, the pope took every care to obtain all possible advantages for the growth of Roman Catholicism in England. Ludovisi, Milleno and other members of the congregation, were directed to insert articles in the contract providing that the offspring of the union should have Roman catholic nurses and that Roman catholic chapels should be erected in every county. Von Ranke attributes the insertion of this latter condition to Urban's desire to prevent Charles's marriage with the infanta by imposing impossible terms. It seems more probable that it was due to ignorance of the strength of the puritan opposition in England, and to a very natural desire to make the best possible bargain with the impetuous prince and his invertebrate father. Urban did  not hesitate to impose as hard terms on Charles, in the negotiations for the French, as for the Spanish marriage. The diplomacy of Richelieu, and Olivarez' folly in quarrelling with Buckingham, broke off the Spanish match. But Catholicism lost nothing by the rupture: the missionary could creep into England behind Henrietta Maria as easily as in the infanta's train. If Charles was bent on winning a catholic bride, he must be prepared to accept the conditions of the curia. So eager was Urban to obtain the best terms for the Roman catholics for England that he roused Richelieu's wrath. The "cardinal of the Huguenots" cared far more for the political than the religious value of the English alliance. However every precaution was taken to procure the alleviation of the penal laws against papists, and to ensure the education of Henrietta's children in their mother's faith, without prejudice to their right to the crown. In the earlier Spanish negotiations they were to be educated by catholics till their tenth year: now the limit was raised to the thirteenth. Henrietta was to be accompanied by a bishop and twenty-four chaplains: the bishop was to have full civil and criminal jurisdiction over members of his household. The death of James in the spring of 1625 rendered the French court still more impatient of the pope's indifference to any but religious issues: there was some talk of proceeding with the marriage without the required dispensation. But Richelieu was saved the trouble of deciding this question by the arrival of the desired documents, together with the announcement that cardinal Francesco Barberini was commissioned, as legate, to honour the wedding with the papal blessing.

Rome did not, it is true, obtain all the advantages she had expected from the alliance. The puritan fanaticism of the English parliament forced Charles to dismiss the French catholics of the queen's household, and to be the unwilling oppressor of his wife's co-religionists: the king was prevented by his subjects from carrying out the marriage contract in full. The curia was shocked by the news of Buckingham's expedition in aid of the Huguenots. The pontiff fulminated against England's breach of faith; Spada, the papal nuncio at Paris, obtained the dispatch of Bassompierre to protest against Charles' conduct: efforts were made to unite Olivarez and Richelieu in a holy war of vengeance against the English heretic. By the end of May 1627 all the necessary arrangements had been made. While the French captured the enemy's merchant ships in the Channel, and held the narrow seas, a Spanish fleet of 150 vessels was to attack England: meanwhile a detachment would descend on Ireland, which was to be handed over to the Holy See, "it being so much to the advantage of France and Spain that that island should be in papal hands".  The new Armada was no more successful than the old. Disturbances arose in Italy which effectually shattered Urban's plans. Even if Richelieu ever seriously intended to make the attempt, he had found a better field for French aggrandisement in the question of the Mantuan succession. The pope was rudely awakened from his dreams of an England recovered for the church, by a fresh struggle between that church's children. The conversion of the heretical island by armed force was an impossibility, but, with a catholic queen on the throne, there was no cause for despondency. In his struggle with the puritan opposition Charles was bound to entertain more friendly feelings towards the oppressed papists, and Urban was yet to find ample scope for his energies in the troubled condition of the Stuart king's dominions.

The question of prince Charles's marriage was the first, but by no means the most important, of the international problems with which Urban dealt. The Valtelline difficulty, which needed even greater care, had reached an interesting stage at the death of Gregory XV. The subjection of that catholic valley to the heretical Grisons had excited the anxious interest of the papacy as far back as the time of Gregory XIII and Sixtus V; the two pontiffs and their immediate successors had made ineffectual efforts to remove the grievances of the catholic peasantry—the occupation of churches and monasteries by the heretics, the interference with the system of indulgences, and the laws against the operations of the Holy Inquisition. Matters came to a head in the summer of 1620. The catholics asserted that the Grisons had formed a plot for the extermination of all the principal Roman ecclesiastics on a certain day in October: the signal for the massacre was to be given by the words, "Brothers, the die is cast." What truth there is in this story it is difficult to say. It is at any rate certain that the Valtelline peasants found in the political ambitions of the duke of Feria, the Spanish governor of Milan, an easy means of obtaining their religious independence. Far from surprising their catholic subjects, the Grisons found themselves overwhelmed by Spanish troops, which Feria had poured into the mountains. The Hapsburg forces were completely successful; they cut the heretics to pieces "in their houses and in their churches." In four days the valley had been purged of every taint of heresy, and the catholics were masters of the all-important pass. But the hardy Grisons were not so easily subdued. Reprisals took place, and the catholics were loud in their complaints of heretical cruelty. The neighbouring states began to take alarm at Feria's policy. Venice heard with dismay that the archduke Leopold was assembling troops in the Tyrol, and entered into negotiations with the Grisons. It was proposed that the peasants of the Valtelline should receive religious toleration, on the condition that they broke their political ties with the Milanese. On their refusal, Venice applied to Louis XIII, who had a locus standi in the question as the protector of the Grisons confederacy, a position which the kings of France had held since 1509. Savoy joined in the general alarm and addressed a strong remonstrance to the dying Paul V. That pontiff's successor was speedily convinced that Feria's bellicose policy was prompted by other than religious motives: anxious though he was for the maintenance of true religion in the Valtelline, he wrote to Philip III, regretting the impolitic action of the Spanish governor: the letter arrived just after the king's death. There seemed some chance of arranging the question in the March of 1621, by restoring to the Grisons their political rights, while safeguarding the religious privileges of their catholic subjects. Louis XIII, the archduke Leopold, Venice and the Swiss confederation, were willing to guarantee these terms. But the extreme party in the curia took alarm: it was urged that the Grisons, being heretics, were incapable of ruling over catholics; there was the further danger that they might wreak their vengeance on the defenceless peasants of the Valtelline, once the Spanish troops were withdrawn. The difficulty would best be solved by handing over the fortresses to the Holy Father's care, or by allowing him to garrison half of them and entrusting the others to the men of the Valtelline. Eventually the Hapsburgs agreed to the proposals of the Quirinal: the archduke Leopold and the duke of Feria handed over the fortresses they had garrisoned to the papal troops, who were commanded by the pontiff's brother, the duke of Fiano. In return the Valtelline was to remain open for the passage of Spanish troops into Germany, though it was not to be used for the invasion of Italy from Vienna. The religious interests of the inhabitants were to be safeguarded by their annexation to the three Rhoetian confederacies. The more patriotic members of the French court strongly disapproved of these arrangements, and were convinced that Gregory would prove the catspaw of Spain: however, France was saved the trouble of protesting by the death of the Ludovisi pontiff, which occurred before the signing of the treaties.

The problem was a difficult one for a man who had just recovered from a long illness, and was new to the responsibilities of his high office: furthermore, even if Urban was the common father of all catholic princes, as he was never tried of asserting, he was none the less an Italian sovereign. In his youth he had been near enough to the Milanese to see what Spanish government meant; his visit to Benevento had shown him how eager the southern viceroy was for aggression; his legateship at Bologna had enabled him to gauge the complicated politics of northern Italy. Yet, though he was naturally biassed against any extension of Spanish power, he had too high a sense of the dignity of his position to withdraw from the dangerous policy to which his predecessor had committed the papacy. His natural inclination, as a private individual and a ruling sovereign, was to favour the Bourbon rather than the Hapsburg. The ambassadors of the contending parties brought considerable pressure to bear: the Spanish cardinals demanded the publication of a formal censure on Venetian policy, which had encouraged French intervention. Urban recognized that it would be a matter of no small difficulty for the papal troops to hold a position so distant from the main body of the states of the church and so eagerly coveted by the two most powerful catholic princes. Yet, despite private inclination and public fears, he followed the principle which guided him throughout his career—the determination to uphold at all costs the commanding position to which the events of the last half century had raised the Holy See.

His first steps were such that the Spaniards could congratulate themselves that they had lost little by the substitution of a Barberini for a Ludovisi in the chair of St. Peter. Urban appeared to take up the task of defending the Valtelline with alacrity. Without possessing Julius II's enthusiasm for war for its own sake, he took a keen pleasure in military affairs, and, as subsequent events showed, believed strongly in the importance of the papacy possessing an army sufficiently strong to command respect from its neighbours. He ordered his brother Carlo to despatch Giovanni Sacchetti, with the title of commander-general, to the disputed territory." At the same time he wrote to the governor of Milan to express his willingness to take over the fortresses, especially Chiavenna and Riva. As the price of his mediation he obtained 200,000 scudi for the payment of his troops: for the future maintenance of the papal garrisons it was arranged that the pope should impose duties on the wine and cheese of the Valtelline. It looked as if the question was settled by Urban's display of energy and impartiality. The Grisons by themselves could do nothing: little danger threatened from Savoy: Venice, though her history had taught her to fear papal encroachments, was in no position to withstand the Quirinal and the Escurial

But Urban miscalculated the attitude of France. The days of French weakness were rapidly drawing to a close. The reins of government were passing from the incompetent laymen to a cardinal, who, despite his ecclesiatical position, held quite different views as to the temporal functions of the papacy from those which obtained favour at the curia. Though eager enough for the reform of the morals and discipline of the gallican priesthood, Richelieu, from the first, set his face firmly against the pretensions of ultramontanism. "Une foi, une loi, un roi," was his ideal; but the law was to be the law of the king, not of the pope; the faith was not to include the doctrine that the Vatican could dispense subjects from obedience to their sovereign. Richelieu was the enemy of disruption, whether it came from the Huguenot or the Jesuit, and whilst he crushed the heretic by force of arms, he knew well enough how to manage the ultramontane by threats or by diplomacy.

But of all this men, as yet, knew nothing. La Vieuville still dominated the council of Louis XIII. Although he was the enemy of Spain and had already protested against the unwarrantable encroachments of the Hapsburgs, it was not to be supposed that he would jeopardize the influence of France with the new pontiff by attacking the papal troops. Urban felt so sure of his position that he suggested that, should the powers interested object to the retention of the Valtelline by the troops of the church, one of his nephews might be invested with the valley. To this plan the Spaniards assented at first, but, on reconsidering the matter, they began to raise objections. Sillery, the French ambassador, was even more decidedly against the proposal. Finally it was arranged that the papacy should remain in possession, and that the Spaniards should have a right of way through the pass. But by this time Richelieu had made his influence felt in Louis' council. Sillery was recalled for his weakness in assenting to the Hapsburg claim; and Bethune, who replaced him, renewed the demand, which had been put forward by his master in February 1623, in conjunction with Venice and Savoy, for the fulfilment of the treaty of Madrid.

This change of front completely bewildered and enraged Urban. When the demand for an anti-Spanish policy changed into veiled threats of armed intervention from France, his embarrassment increased. His nuncios in France and Switzerland assured him there was no real danger. He could not believe that either Louis or Charles Emmanuel, the Swiss confederacy or the Venetian senate, would dare to commit the sacrilege of tearing down the papal banner from the fortresses it guarded. He did not realize (and he can hardly be blamed for his blindness) that in Richelieu's eyes all other considerations were as nothing when weighed against the necessities of France, and that the chief of those necessities then was to snap the Hapsburg chain at its weakest link. So the "Common Father" did nothing, while his rebellious sons were scheming to shame him before the world.

In the winter of 1624, Richelieu felt himself strong enough to move. Bethune's final suggestion, that the pope should restore the fortresses to Spain, was rejected, though it was made to preserve the papal dignity. De Coeuvres at once advanced southward with the French and the Swiss troops, while Venice lent her aid to the invader. The papal army, taken by surprise and deprived of all intelligent leadership, made a feeble resistance. The news of the fall of Plata Mala reduced the pope to impotent anger: even then he could not believe that his authority would be flouted by the allied powers. He suggested an armistice and a reference to Madrid, as it was beneath his dignity to treat with the governor of the Milanese. But the time for negotiation had passed: Bethune was firm, and de Coeuvres proceeded on his path of victory. The Spaniards made spasmodic efforts to retrieve the fortunes of war, but they were hampered by the attack of Lesdiguieres and Charles Emmanuel on Genoa. Early in 1625 Richelieu's policy seemed everywhere triumphant. But the ally of the heretic Grisons had forgotten the Huguenots. In January Soubise roused his co-religionists to a fresh rebellion, and, by a sudden attack, captured the six vessels which composed the French navy, in the port of Blavet in Brittany. Richelieu was forced to withdraw from his Italian entanglement, but he refused to surrender his prey. The demands of the ultramontanes and their chief, Berulles, that he should give way to Urban and Olivarez over the Valtelline, fell on deaf ears. While he crushed the Huguenots with Dutch and English ships, his opponents in Italy effected nothing, though Urban made a show of energy by sending fresh troops to co-operate with the governor of Milan against the Grisons. The corrupt and inefficient government of Olivarez, hampered by its struggle with the two great maritime powers of Protestantism, failed to use its opportunity. Without effective help from Spain, Urban was powerless. Philip IV's ministers complained of the pope's partiality for France; the pontiff declared that he had made costly sacrifices for a power which rewarded him by calling him a heretic. Richelieu profited by his enemies' mutual recriminations. He repudiated the unsatisfactory agreement made by du Fargis, the French ambassador at Madrid, and on May 10, 1626, signed a treaty at Barcelona (commonly known as the Treaty of Monzon). By it France obtained everything for which she had fought: the Grisons recovered their sovereignty over the Valtelline, which was to retain its religious privileges and the right of electing its own officials: the Spaniards resigned all claims to the passes which formed their only safe method of communication with Austria: the pope was allotted the disputed fortresses, on the condition that they were destroyed.

Urban had despatched Francesco Barberini to the courts of Paris and Madrid, for the purpose of negotiating peace, but the legate can have had little influence on the framing of such conditions. Despite the numerous protests addressed by the curia to France, Spain and Venice, the papal authority was openly disregarded: even the provision for restoring the Valtelline fortresses to the army of the church was little better than a mockery. The only result which Urban could regard with satisfaction was the new security for the preservation of the catholic religion in the Valtelline. But conditions, practically as good as these, could have been obtained in the early months of his pontificate; had he accepted them then, he would not have seen the papal banners riddled with the bullets of the Swiss and the Venetian soldiery, nor the suggestions of his legate treated with equal indifference by France and Spain. Urban had erred in over-estimating the authority of the church with catholic princes; he had sent his army to hold a position which was untenable in face of attack; he had lent his spiritual sanction to projects designed mainly to increase the secular power of the Hapsburgs; he had completely miscalculated the strength and the policy of France; he had been as blindly self-confident, when caution was needed, as he had been irresolute in the face of danger. Much of the responsibility for the humiliation of the papacy must rest with Gregory XV and cardinal Ludovisi; they committed the Quirinal with a light heart to the furtherance of the Hapsburg ambitions in north Italy. But their mistakes cannot wholly excuse Urban's. From beginning to end his policy was a failure, rendered all the more impressive by the lofty pretensions he advanced.

The questions of the possession of the Valtelline and the marriage of Charles Stuart were only loosely connected with the great struggle, which was proceeding in Germany; but as they were decided against Spain, they necessarily influenced the fortunes of the Austrian Hapsburgs unfavourably. In both cases Richelieu outmanoeuvred Olivarez. But the Spaniard considered that the misfortunes of the Hapsburgs were due largely to the misconduct of the pope. On his side Urban resented the attempts of Borgia and his dependents to use the papacy for the furtherance of their secular aims. The antipathy which he felt for Philip IV and his court was extended to the Hapsburg who ruled at Vienna. Old memories of the struggle between pope and emperor may have come back to him. Almost a century had passed since Bourbon's ruffians had sacked Rome, but the enmity between the temporal and the spiritual heads of Catholicism, which had broken Clement VII and paralyzed Charles V, might easily revive. It was only necessary that the empire should regain its old strength, to arouse the jealous fears of the successor of Hildebrand and the Innocents. This was precisely what had occurred when Urban succeeded Gregory. The danger which had threatened the church in Bohemia had passed with the flight of the count palatine from the White Mountain. Ferdinand had given proof of his new power by robbing the calvinist Wittelsbach of his electoral hat and transferring it to his catholic relative.

1623.

Tilly had crushed Christian of Brunswick at the battle of Stadtlohn. Only Mansfeld and August his army of mercenaries held the field against the emperor and his Bavarian ally. Urban might well fear that Ferdinand and Philip, once united through the Alpine passes, would revive the empire of Charles V; such an event must necessarily rob the papacy of its most cherished privilege, freedom from the domination of the secular power.

Yet Urban's action in the Valtelline quarrel had been in the interests of the Hapsburgs. He continued to encourage Ferdinand to carry out the vow which he had made before the shrine of the Virgin at Loretto. Carlo Caraffa, the able envoy accredited by Gregory XV to the imperial court, was continued in his nunciature; the vigour with which he had supervised the reintroduction of Roman doctrine and ritual into Bohemia had fully earned him this reward. Urban instructed him to maintain his resolute resistance to those secular authorities who cared more for the extension of the emperor's sovereignty than the pope's. That Ferdinand was sincere in his crusade against Protestantism is indisputable: but the war was already losing its purely religious aspect; the leaders on either side were animated by motives largely secular. It was all the more important, therefore, that the people should keep the emperor rigidly to his task; the advancement of catholic principles was not to be hindered by the political needs of the temporal head of catholicism.

June 1624.

 Montorio, Gregory's nuncio at Köln, was succeeded by Ludovico Caraffa: the new legate received very definite instructions as to his conduct in that troubled region—instructions based largely on the report of his predecessor. That document revealed a deplorable condition of things in the church of northern and central Germany: besides other practices derogatory to the Holy See, the Teutonic ecclesiastics disregarded the Roman regulations as to marriages and appointments to benefices: discipline had become lax in the monasteries and convents: the general standard of clerical morality left much to be desired. Caraffa was directed to remedy these abuses, and report on any others he might find. He was to forward to Rome the names of priests whose zeal and piety marked them out as fit persons for preferment, to appoint coadjutors to carry out the work of incompetent or ailing bishops, and to make every effort to strengthen the ties between the members of the church in Germany and their lord in Rome. But internal reform was to go hand in hand with external growth. Missionaries, especially the Jesuits, were to be encouraged by all possible means, the resources of the catholic league supplemented, the foundation of catholic colleges accelerated. Where new universities were being founded, as at Münster, provision was to be made for the teaching of canon law. No effort was to be spared for the recovery of the heretical bishoprics, by the election of catholics in place of protestants. In these instructions Urban showed sound judgment: there was no political problem to confuse him, no fear of raising up a catholic monarchy to dominate the catholic church. From the victories of Maximilian and the League nothing but good could accrue: there was no danger that they would endeavour to dictate terms to the curia.

For the first two years of his pontificate, Urban was able to work harmoniously with Ferdinand for the restoration of Catholicism within the empire, and to rejoice in the victories which crowned the arms of Tilly; his task was to confirm for Catholicism, through his emissaries, what the emperor won through his generals, to see that catholic statesmen carried on the restoration of their church without yielding to the pressure of extraneous political motives. But the character of the war was rapidly changing. It was no longer a struggle fought out by Germans, to decide whether Germany should be ruled by the dogmas of Rome or of Geneva. Foreign princes who were interested in German Protestantism had begun to intervene. James of England had at last been roused into action by Charles and Buckingham, who had convinced him that nothing was to be hoped from his Spanish policy. English ambassadors had proceeded to the courts of Denmark and Sweden, with offers of assistance to Christian IV and Gustavus Adolphus, should they take up the task of defending Protestantism. Christian made use of his position, as duke of Holstein and count of Oldenburg, to intervene, and accepted the English offers of men and money. Gustavus saw clearly the real needs of the situation and refused to move without more liberal supplies.

April 25, August 22, 1626

The Danish king's enterprise served only to improve Ferdinand's position: the victories of Wallenstein at the bridge of Dessau, and of Tilly at the battle of Lutter, raised the emperor to a dangerous eminence. The deaths of Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick removed two of the greatest remaining obstacles to his ambitions. Nevertheless, Urban, though he might well have been alarmed at the growth of the imperial power and pretensions, continued to support the champion of Catholicism. It is true that he refused the emperor's request in the matter of the monastery of St. Maximin, because it conflicted with the papal claims in general and with the archbishop of Trier's jurisdiction in particular; but he showed his goodwill by conferring on Ferdinand's son, Leopold Wilhelm, the see of Bremen and the abbey of Hirtzcheld, and by confirming his election to the recovered bishopric of Halberstadt in place of Augustus of Saxony. A little later disputes arose between Rome and Vienna about the territories of Castiglione, Bardi and Campiano, which were likely to be affected by the projected marriage of prince Doria. Urban upheld his rights over the fiefs of the Apostolic See, and the friction between pope and emperor increased.

Every step which Ferdinand took towards the goal of his political ambitions led him farther away from the straight path of religious duty, in which Urban desired him to tread. The rapid growth of Wallenstein's influence in the imperial councils showed that his master was no longer fighting simply to reimpose Catholicism on his nominal subjects. From a man who believed in religious toleration for the warring creeds, under the political supremacy of himself and his master, the papacy had nothing to hope. Naturally Urban attached himself more and more closely to the interests of Bavaria and the Catholic League, though he spared no efforts which might influence the emperor to extend the church.

Reconciliation with Ferdinand was to a large extent dependent on the relations between the Quirinal and the Escurial. The legateship of Francesco Barberini at Madrid had resulted in a friendlier feeling between the papacy and the Spanish Hapsburgs, although Borgia at Rome murmured against Urban's refusal to become the willing instrument of Spanish ambition. Philip IV marked his appreciation of Urban's attitude by despatching Ferdinand of Toledo, constable of Navarre, to Rome, to improve still further the relations between May Spain and the papacy.

May 1629.

The envoy's mission was a complete failure. Disputes arose on questions of precedence: words gave place to blows, and some of Toledo's followers were imprisoned. Borgia and his adherents were loud in their protests against Urban's action.

Later in the year a more momentous event occurred, which was destined to have a far-reaching effect on the destinies of Europe. On October 26, Vincenzo, duke of Mantua and Montferrat, died, and with him the direct line of the Gonzagas came to an end. Urban had foreseen that considerable difficulty might arise as to the succession, and had instructed his envoys at the courts of Paris, Madrid, Vienna, Venice and Turin to make every effort for a peaceable succession. The next of kin to the deceased duke was Charles Gonzaga, duke of Nevers and Rethel; his claims were superior to those of Maria, daughter of the late Francesco of Mantua, granddaughter of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, and great-granddaughter of Philip II of Spain. She was shut out from the succession to Mantua, if not to Montferrat, by the principle of the Salic law; the same law barred the pretensions of the duchess of Lorraine: the claims of Ferrante Gonzaga, duke of Guastalla, derived their strength solely from the support of Spain.

The rights of the case seemed sufficiently clear. Vienna and Madrid united in assuring Urban that there was no intention of depriving Nevers of his inheritance. But the latter was suspicious of the intentions of Olivarez; he decided to strengthen his position by marrying his distant kinswoman, Maria Gonzaga. For protection against the emperor he relied on his relationship to the empress. While omitting to inform Vienna or Madrid of his projected marriage, Nevers did not venture to proceed without the papal sanction. Urban received the proposals favourably and, following the precedents in such cases, granted the necessary dispensation. The news that Vincenzo was dead, and that Nevers had married his niece and succeeded to his throne, reached the Hapsburg monarchs simultaneously. The sincerity of their previous protestations was now seen. Olivarez exclaimed that his master had been deliberately insulted, and Borgia protested that the pope's action in granting the dispensation was wholly unwarrantable. Urban seems to have been conscious that his conduct might provoke recriminations. When he was new to his high office, he had said that he would make himself respected if he were armed. He was not content now to rely on the purely religious weapons of the papacy. He proclaimed the necessity of calling up the papal troops and of imposing a contribution on his subjects.

October 1627

Monterey, who now represented Philip at Rome, protested ; he refused to believe that Urban would content himself with the part of spectator, and asserted that an army of over 15,000 men was excessive for defensive purposes. Urban replied by explaining the necessity of guarding the extensive territories of the church; the Venetians were already in arms and there was always the danger from the heretics of Germany. It is hardly possible that the pope can have been hinting at Ferdinand's designs; but with England engaged in war with France, the king of Denmark crushed, John George of Saxony always inactive, and Gustavus Adolphus fully occupied with Poland, it is difficult to see what dangers threatened Rome from lutheran or calvinist. Urban further pointed out that he had made no protest against the military preparations of the Neapolitan viceroy; he therefore expected similar treatment from the viceroy's master. He had not condemned the Hapsburgs' action against the duke of Mantua as unjust, nor had he made alliance with Venice. The pope's arguments served merely to exasperate Monterey. The gulf between Rome and Madrid began to widen.

At first it looked as if Nevers was doomed. Ferdinand, flushed by his success in the north, talked of reviving the imperial power in Italy, and appointed commissioners to administer the fiefs of Mantua and Montferrat, until he had decided the rights of the various claimants. Gonsalvo of Cordova, governor of Milan, collected troops to avenge the insult to Philip of Spain. Charles Emmanuel, disgusted by Richelieu's conduct in the Valtelline question, joined his former foes for the purpose of expelling the French intruder. Venice, ever jealous of the Hapsburgs, made overtures to France, but Louis and Richelieu were too busy with the siege of La Rochelle to indulge in an Italian campaign; they could only urge Nevers to hold out, and promise assistance once the Huguenots were crushed. At the beginning of 1628 Urban still hoped for peace, despite his own unpopularity with the ambassador and the cardinals of Spain. He instructed Pamphili, the nuncio at Madrid, to use all means to hold back Philip from war. At the same time he caused Carlo Caraffa to make efforts to reconcile Ferdinand with Nevers, by playing on the empress's affection for her kinsman. But the emperor refused to listen either to his wife or to the young duke of Rethel, who came to plead his father's cause later in the year, under Urban's patronage. The pope pointed out the inconsistency of Spanish policy, which had opposed Savoy in 1613 on the Montferrat question and was now upholding her claims: nor did he fail to emphasize the dangers of scattering the forces of Catholicism, while the heretic was beaten, but not crushed. Meanwhile, Richelieu made overtures to him, to induce him to join in the defence of Nevers. Urban refused, and, when war broke out, the new duke's chances seemed hopeless.

It was difficult to remain neutral in the face of the renewed pressure of France in April and the requests of the Spaniards for the passage of their troops through the papal territory. But Urban refused to jeopardize his chances of mediating between the rival catholic powers. He had good reason to dread the success of Spain, and he was angry with France for signing a secret article with England for the restitution of the Palatinate to its heretic count. Venice joined in the request for intervention, but the influence of the Venetian cardinals was too weak to succeed where Richelieu had failed. Mantua was in the direst straits, but Urban set his face against the proposal that he should form a league for its defence. He still hoped to restore peace by mediation, and despatched two envoys into Lombardy for that purpose. Of these, Carlo Barberini took up his duties of guarding papal territory from aggression, while cardinal Antonio was entrusted with the task of negotiating. But both sides desired the pope's aid, not his mediation. In February 1628 Ferdinand and Wallenstein attempted to draw Urban into an alliance by talking of a crusade against the Turk.

October 28, 1628

A little later, Monterey, alarmed by the fall of La Rochelle and the prospect of French intervention, made fresh overtures. He gave vent to some acrimonious references to the promptness with which Nevers' request for a dispensation had been granted, and suggested that Urban should enter into a defensive league with his Catholic Majesty to prove the baselessness of the rumours which accused him of partiality for France. Not unnaturally the pope replied that such action would hardly advance the cause of peace. The ambassador thereupon accused him of favouring the Venetians by the grant of a tenth from ecclesiastical property, and demanded a like favour for his master. Urban refused, but renewed his diplomatic efforts in the north by sending commissioners to Bologna. The Spaniard declined to abandon his prey, and Nevers' hopes of French help kept him loyal to his allies.

March 29, 1629

The Edict of Restitution, though gratefully received by Urban and acknowledged by an effusive letter, did not move him from his neutrality. Meanwhile, the fortune of war had changed. On March 3, Louis entered Genoa in triumph. Eight days later, as the result of negotiations between Richelieu and Victor Amadeus, prince of Piedmont, a treaty was signed which withdrew Savoy from the war and paralyzed the governor of Milan.

The emperor refused to recognize a treaty which disregarded imperial claims, seized the Grisons passes and poured fresh troops into Italy. Spain attacked Louis in his own kingdom. Urban's aversion to Philip was increased by the spectacle of his Catholic Majesty aiding the heretics of France. The Spanish ambassador did not improve matters by renewing his protest against the further increase of papal armaments. Louis was successful against his rebellious subjects, but his withdrawal from Piedmont increased the advantages of the Hapsburgs in Italy. In October, Urban's policy at last led to a short truce between the contending parties. Colla Ito, the imperialist general, approached Antonio Barberini, and Spinola, the new governor of Milan, joined in the negotiations. As usual, Spain threw difficulties in the way, by proposing Milan as a meeting place; of course de Crequi objected. But the pope was determined to make every effort. Antonio's subordinate, Mazarin, was sent to Milan and Turin. The imperial ambassador, prince Savelli, was received at Rome with every mark of friendship. He informed Urban that his master was sincerely desirous for peace between catholic princes and for a general war against the heretic and the infidel. The pope replied that those were exactly his own wishes. But he may well have doubted the emperor's good faith when every rising of the Huguenots had received open or covert support from the Hapsburgs, and the imperial condottiere, Wallenstein, hinted that Rome would provide abundant plunder for his victorious troops. The suspicion grew that the negotiations were intended to keep off the attacks of the French, until the emperor had crushed all opposition in Germany and the king of Spain had obtained the upper hand in his struggle with the Dutch. When Savelli insisted that Nevers must beg for pardon, it was obvious that Ferdinand was fighting simply to humiliate France and to assert obsolete rights in Italy, which he would only exercise to the detriment of the other princes of the peninsula.

Still Urban was determined to leave no stone unturned in his efforts for peace. Nevers naturally objected to make the undignified apology which Ferdinand demanded. Bethune was instructed to inform the pope that "France had aided justice, not fomented rebellion." To overcome the difficulty Urban suggested that Nevers should pacify the emperor by confessing that he had erred, and salve the feelings of his French allies by adding that his error had been committed unwittingly. On January 28, 1630, the ruler of France received in audience his destined successor. Mazarin endeavoured to persuade the cardinal to accept the papal proposal of a further armistice, but Richelieu replied that France had suffered too much already by following such courses: he was perfectly willing to make peace, but he would accept no conditions which described France as the ally of rebels against their lawful sovereign. He proposed the immediate investiture of Nevers with the duchy, of which he was the rightful heir; measures for his future security by the withdrawal of the imperial troops and by the reduction of the armaments of the Milanese to their normal standard; a league of Italian princes to secure their own independence and the safety of Mantua against France and Spain; a simultaneous evacuation of the disputed fiefs by the contending armies; and the restoration of Susa to Savoy. As to the form of Nevers' investiture, he suggested that the emperor should act at the "reiterated request of his Most Christian Majesty and other catholic princes"; the duke was to declare that his intention was "always to be the most humble servant of his majesty", and to express his sorrow for his unconscious error. Urban knew well that Ferdinand's pride would never consent to such terms, and instructed Antonio Barberini to secure concessions from the French. Panziroli, who had been nuncio extraordinary to the court of Madrid, was sent to Richelieu, but the cardinal was immovable. Spinola's proposal, that the matter should be referred to the infanta of Flanders for arbitration, did not mend matters. In February Urban ordered his nephew to leave Bologna and to proceed to Piedmont, to induce the French, with whom he was extremely popular, to come to terms. Antonio, who had just lost his father, devoted his best energies to the task of reconciliation, but all efforts were fruitless. The delay, which Ferdinand had hoped would have enabled the imperialists to free themselves from their entanglements in the north, had only served the interests of France.

September 1629

The diplomacy of Charnace had freed Gustavus Adolphus from the Polish war, and the Swedish king was preparing to take the field from which Christian of Denmark had been driven so ignominiously. The intrigues of the queen mother, Marie de Medicis, and of the heir presumptive, Gaston of Orleans, had failed to overthrow Richelieu or to change Louis' Italian policy. The cardinal himself took command of the French troops and advanced against Charles Emmanuel's camp at Rivoli.

March 19, 1630

There was no place for the diplomacy of Antonio Barberini and Mazarin for the moment: but the capture of Pinerolo by Richelieu drove Spain, Savoy and the imperialists to appeal to Urban. Once again the pope failed, as Richelieu  refused to surrender Pinerolo.

March 20, 1630

Collalto and Spinola invested Casale and Mantua, and, when Richelieu and Louis had withdrawn to France after the capture of Chambery, the hopes of their enemies rose, and peace seemed as far off as ever. Urban turned as a last resource to Maximilian of Bavaria: with great clearness he showed that the interest of pope and emperor alike demanded a concentration of catholic forces against the Swede: in haggling over the terms on which Nevers should receive his duchy, Ferdinand was pursuing a selfish policy at the expense of the church. Maximilian used his best efforts to reconcile the emperor to a policy of moderation, but in vain. Behind Ferdinand stood the sinister figure of Wallenstein. The great adventurer aimed, not at the extension of the creed he half professed, but at the aggrandisement of the duke of Friedland under the shadow of the imperial crown.

In June 1630 Ferdinand of Austria reached the crisis of his career. He had acquired a greater power than any of his predecessors, save Charles V, had held since the fall of the Hohenstaufen.

May 1629

By the peace of Lubeck, Christian of Denmark had definitely abandoned the cause of Protestantism. The Edict of Restitution had failed to arouse the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg: in the north Stralsund alone had defied the armies of Wallenstein: Bethlen Gabor, the unquiet prince of Transylvania, was dead: the Turkish empire, under Amurath IV, had lost its ancient vigour: in Italy there was every probability that Mantua and Casale must yield to the Hapsburg arms: the pope, if not a mere Hapsburg puppet, could hardly be ill-disposed to the author of the Edict of Restitution. France and Sweden alone threatened danger; but at any moment the weakness of Louis might undo the work of Richelieu, and Gustavus Adolphus was held of small account by the statesmen of Vienna.

To secure his house in the splendid heritage he had won, Ferdinand summoned the diet of the empire to meet at Regensburg. His object was to effect the election of his son, Ferdinand of Hungary, as king of the Romans; he also desired to settle the Mantuan question if possible. That there might be some difficulty in obtaining his wishes the emperor must have been aware, but he can hardly have expected the furious opposition which his proposals evoked. From all sides complaints arose as to Wallenstein's conduct: the electors, catholic and protestant alike, declaimed against the methods by which the Edict of Restitution had been carried out. The duke of Bavaria, supported by the Catholic League, was anxious to regain the military position from which he had been thrust. The opposition to the emperor and his general was sedulously fostered by the French envoys, Leon de Brûlart and the capuchin, père Joseph. Instead of proceeding to the election of a king of the Romans, the diet demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein and the transference of the direction of the army to Maximilian.

The demands of the catholic powers did not arise from an unworthy desire to extort concessions from a benevolent over-lord, who fought only for the faith, but from a perfectly genuine and well-grounded suspicion of a bastard Caesaropapism resting on the military power of an ambitious condottiere. If Richelieu intrigued with the calvinists of Holland and the Rhineland, Olivarez never ceased to urge the Huguenots to rebellion. If Louis refused to acknowledge ultramontane doctrines in France, Ferdinand restored the secularized lands to the church, that he might himself nominate to the recovered benefices. If France was the ally of the Swede, Wallenstein intrigued with Denmark, and Spain proposed the restoration of the Palatinate to Frederick V, despite the protests of the papal nuncio. Ferdinand was fighting for the catholic church, but the catholic church was to be dominated by Vienna, not by Rome. Where the rights of religion hindered his political schemes, he was ready to abandon them. The German princes, without distinctions of creed, had joined in protesting against the Edict of Restitution: he was ready to modify it, in order to secure his political supremacy. Danger threatened from Sweden: he negotiated with Gustavus in order "to concentrate all his force upon Italy, that the Mantuan war might be brought to an end, and the pope compelled to an acknowledgment of his ecclesiastical claims." In every particular the emperor made it clear that the interests of the church were to be subordinated to his own political schemes.

Urban, then, had to choose between two evils: if he threw his influence into the scale against the emperor, there was the danger of Gustavus and the Swedes arresting the reconversion of north Germany; if he favoured Ferdinand, there was every prospect that the catholics of Germany would fall under the domination of Wallenstein, and the freedom of Italy would be sacrificed to Hapsburg ambition. The danger from Ferdinand was thoroughly appreciated, the danger from Gustavus was remote and under-estimated.

Alone of the great German princes, Maximilian was in real sympathy with the curia: accordingly it was to the elector of Bavaria that Urban turned. He instructed the nuncio, Rocci, with whom Palotta was afterwards associated, to maintain the closest understanding with Maximilian, although he was to pay a formal visit to Wallenstein. He was to oppose the restoration of the Palatinate to Frederick, the repeal of the Edict of Restitution, and Ferdinand's claims to nominate to benefices, especially during the reserved months: at the same time the Mantuan succession was to be settled, if possible. On the question of the younger Ferdinand's election, Urban's attitude was doubtful. He can hardly have desired to see any further concession to the Hapsburg hereditary claims, but he did not openly oppose the wishes of the emperor on this point. Rocci offered no objection to Ferdinand's candidature; the pope spoke to the imperial representatives in Rome, as if there were no reason to doubt the emperor's success. But it seems highly probable that the Bavarians were influenced in their subsequent action by the belief that they had the curia behind them.

Rocci found his task difficult. He wrote to Francesco Barberini that it would be advisable to suspend or to limit the Edict of Restitution, since many of the catholic princes wished to use the recovered lands for their own purposes. Urban set his face against the proposal and directed his envoy to enter into closer relations with Maxi­milian. The papal cause found an even more efficient ally in père Joseph. The Capuchin established an extraordinary influence over Ferdinand, and "put six electoral hats into his narrow cowl". Bent on his dynastic schemes, the emperor yielded to the demands of the diet. Wallenstein was dismissed, and with him went the imperialist army. To advance his son, Ferdinand sacrificed his friend; he was rewarded according to his deserts. He had shown that he could not sin boldly, and his enemies were not slow to profit by his weakness. While the disgraced duke of Mecklenburg retired to Gitchin, Gustavus Adolphus overran his newly acquired duchy. The remnants of the imperialist army were handed over to Tilly, the general of the League. Ferdinand of Hungary failed to obtain his election. Nevers was recognized in his duchy of Mantua. The diet of Regensburg had stripped the emperor, who had convened it to further his dynastic ambitions, of the advantages he had won by years of hard fighting and intricate diplomacy.

Urban might well congratulate himself on the results of Rocci's mission. The emperor was no longer dominated by a callous adventurer, half mystic, half heretic. The rights of the papacy in north Germany had been upheld, the Hapsburg power in Italy had been broken. There was every prospect of a final settlement of the Mantuan quarrel. Capitulations of peace had been signed on October 13 by the representatives of the powers interested. Suitable acknowledgment was made of the strenuous efforts which the pope had made for peace, and compensation was allotted to the dukes of Savoy and Guastalla. Nevers was confirmed in his duchy, after making an act of submission to the emperor. The imperialists were to evacuate Mantua, which they had captured, and to destroy their fortifications in Grisons territory. Spain was to withdraw from Montferrat, and France from Piedmont and Savoy. Venice also was included in the treaty. But Richelieu objected to these terms, and asserted that his envoys had exceeded their powers in accepting them. Hostilities were renewed, and Marillac advanced to the relief of Casale. Urban however was determined to make one last effort, and Mazarin arrived just in time to prevent an engagement. The papal envoy succeeded in arranging a truce, but it was not until the spring of 1631 that the commissioners of the powers met at Cherasco, under the presidency of the pope, to arrange a definite peace. Richelieu succeeded in retaining Pinerolo for France, and Victor Amadeus obtained a large part of Montferrat instead of the money indemnity, which had previously been assigned to him. By the treaty of Cherasco the Mantuan question was laid to rest for a time.